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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



18 OACSFOR

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (19 Oct 67) FOR 19 19 RD-670256

25 October 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report 6 Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery [47.8]

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

9 Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 30 Apr 67.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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108th Infantry Brigade
2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery
5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D HOWITZER BATTALION, 35TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96376

AVGAY-CO

9 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
54th Artillery Group
ATTN: AVGAY-C
APO San Francisco 96376

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-FA-C
APO San Francisco 96227

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVC-LH
APO San Francisco 96307

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-1H
APO San Francisco 96556

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

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FOR OT RD File
670256

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SECTION I

Significant Headquarters or Unit Activities

1. (U) Administration and Personnel

a. The 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery remained assigned to the 54th Artillery Group. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and Battery B maintained a permanent base camp at XUAN LOC YT 473097. Battery A maintains a permanent base camp at NUI DAT, YS 428665. Battery C maintained temporary base camps at BIEN HOA, YT 023148 and a permanent base camp at XUAN LOC, YT 473097. On 26 April 1967 C Battery was relieved of the responsibility of maintaining a base camp at BIEN HOA.

b. Normal SI activities have been conducted during the period 1 February 1967 through 30 April 1967.

c. Personnel strength of the command on 30 April was:

UNIT	TOE AUTH			MTOE PENDING			ASSIGNED		
	OFF	WO	LM	OFF	WO	LM	OFF	WO	LM
Headquarters Battery	15	0	112	2	1	24	11	0	167
A Battery	3	0	117	2	0	4	3	0	142
B Battery	3	0	117	2	0	4	6	0	135
C Battery	3	0	117	2	0	4	5	0	140
Service Battery	3	3	82	0	0	0	2	2	97
TOTALS	27	3	545	8	1	36	27	2	681

General Order No. 80, HQ, 5th US Army dated 20 April 1966 authorized the strength of the battalion as 33 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 574 LM. This includes all of the above mentioned pending MTOE except 2 officers and 7 LM of the aviation section.

d. Critical MOS shortages in ECO grades: During the reporting period there were no key MOS shortages experienced.

e. Personnel changes during this quarter include:

GAINS:	OFF	WO	LM	LOSSES:	OFF	WO	LM
	3	0	142		6	1	95

f. Casualties included:

TYPE	NUMBER
Killed in Action	2
Wounded in Action	56
Missing in Action	0
Non Battle Dead	0
Non Battle Casualties	6

SECTION I (Cont'd)

g. Awards and Decorations presented to members of this command included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Silver Star	0
Legion of Merit	0
Bronze Star (Valor)	0
Bronze Star (Achievement)	5
Bronze Star (Merit)	24
Air Medal (Merit)	7
Air Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster)	1
Commendation Medal (Valor)	0
Commendation Medal (Merit)	13
Commendation Medal (Achievement)	6
Purple Heart	28
Purple Heart (OLC)	1

NOTE: In addition to these awards, 150 recommendations for awards have been submitted and are pending approval by USAFV.

h. R & R program schedules include the following:

(1) The in-country R&R consisting of 3 day passes to VUNG TAU has been utilized by 16 personnel.

(2) The out of country R&R included the following 5 day quotas;

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bangkok	13	10	23	46
Tokyo	17	13	9	39
Manila	4	2	2	8
Hong Kong	10	11	7	28
Taipei	16	14	10	40
Singapore	3	4	0	7
Kuala Lumpur	0	0	0	0
Penang	5	3	2	10
Hawaii	12	14	6	32

i. Unit mail clerks pick up and deliver mail from the nearest APO. Numbers for the units are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>APO</u>
Headquarters Battery	96376
A Battery	96291
B Battery	96376
C Battery	96376
Service Battery	96491

SECTION I (Cont'd)

j. Judicial and Nonjudicial actions by units included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ARTICLE 15</u>	<u>SUMMARY COURT</u>	<u>SPECIAL COURT</u>	<u>GENERAL COURT</u>
Headquarters Battery	2	0	1	0
A Battery	3	0	1	0
B Battery	2	0	0	0
C Battery	1	0	0	0
Service Battery	3	0	2	0
TOTALS	11	0	4	0

k. Pertinent medical service statistics include:

Total patient visits (unit personnel)	466
Admitted to hospital	42
Evacuated within the country	15
Malaria cases	0

l. Reportable accidents included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VEHICLE</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
Headquarters Battery	1	0	2
A Battery	1	0	1
B Battery	1	0	0
C Battery	1	0	3
Service Battery	1	0	1
TOTALS	5	0	7

m. The morale of the command is outstanding. Units in permanent base camp enjoy nightly movies and organized athletics to include basketball, volley ball and softball. Day room equipment has been issued to Headquarters, A, and Service Batteries, the three which have dayrooms, and permanent buildings are being constructed. NCO and enlisted mens clubs are provided in all base camp areas.

n. Educational opportunities for personnel are provided by USAFI extension courses.

o. Religious services, both Protestant and Catholic, are held on a regular weekly basis. A Bible study is conducted weekly by the 54th Artillery Group Chaplain. A permanent chapel has been provided in the XUAN LOC base camp.

p. Throughout the battalion, personal hygiene, prophylaxis usage and frequent lectures on venereal diseases have helped in lowering the VD rate. The battery commanders, surgeon, and chaplain complement each other's efforts to find solutions to the problem.

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SECTION I (Cont'd)

2. (U) Intelligence.

a. The semiannual inspection of classified documents was completed 3 April 1967. No discrepancies were found.

b. The battalion continues its mission to provide air observers for visual reconnaissance of the XUAN LOC area. The area of responsibility is generally limited by the range of the 175mm guns. The average number of missions and hours flown per day are three missions and six hours respectively.

c. Target acquisition and the planning of H&I fires continue to be performed by the 54th Artillery Group.

3. (U) Training

a. The battalion has undertaken an extremely intensified on-the-job training program for all personnel. All newly assigned personnel are receiving forty hours of formal training in tactics and weapons familiarization prior to being assigned to the batteries. A program to acquaint new artillery fire direction computers with the problems and procedures inherent with operations in the Republic of Vietnam as well as the cross-training of survey computers as artillery computers has proven extremely effective.

b. The following periods of mandatory instruction were given to all personnel during the reporting period.

- (1) Command information - 12 hours
- (2) Character guidance - 6 hours
- (3) Prevention of heat casualties - 3 hours
- (4) First aid (emphasis on controlling bleeding) - 2 hours

4. (C) Operations

a. Normal operations, consistent with the battalion mission, were conducted during the reporting period.

b. At the beginning of the reporting period the battalion was deployed as follows:

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery located at XUAN LOC, YT 473097, with normal support missions and base camp defense.

(2) Service Battery at LONG BINH, YT 056116, with normal support mission.

(3) A Battery at NUI DAT Y3 428665 with mission of general support reinforcing (GER) the 1st Bn 83d Arty.

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SECTION I (Cont'd)

(4) B Battery at TAY NINH attached to the 25th Infantry Division with the mission of GSR 25th Infantry Division Artillery.

(5) C Battery was located at DAU TIENG, XT495475, attached to the 1st Infantry Division with a mission of base camp defense.

c. On 18 February the battalion (less C Battery) was attached to the 25th Infantry Division to support Operation Junction City. The battalion (-) was positioned northwest of TAY NINH City. Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (8" SP) was attached to the battalion on 19 February. During the operation the battalion occupied three tactical positions, all in PHUOC NINH District. Btry A, 2d Bn, 32d Arty was detached on 15 March. On 15 March the battalion was detached from the 25th Infantry Division and moved to XUAN LOC base camp. A Battery moved to NUI DAT base camp on 20 March. Battalion missions during the operation were:

19 Feb - 21 Feb	GS 25th Infantry Division, Reinforcing 3/13 Arty
21 Feb - 6 Mar	GS 25th Infantry Division, Reinforcing 3/82 Arty
6 Mar - 14 Mar	GS 25th Infantry Division, Reinforcing 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Artillery
6 Mar - 10 Mar	DS 3/21 Infantry (A Battery only)

d. C Battery was committed to Operation Junction City on 18 February by the 1st Infantry Division, to which it was attached. During the operation the battery made 12 tactical moves within QUAN PHUOC Province. The battery was detached from the 1st Infantry Division on 14 April and returned to BIEN HOA base camp on 14 April. The missions of C Battery during the operation were:

21 Feb - 3 Mar	GS 1st Infantry Division, Reinforcing 8/6 Arty
3 Mar - 18 Mar	GS 1st Infantry Division, Reinforcing 2/33 Arty
18 Mar - 20 Mar	GS 1st Infantry Division, Reinforcing 1/5 Arty
20 Mar - 7 Apr	GS 1st Infantry Division, Reinforcing 8/6 Arty
7 Apr - 10 Apr	DS 1/26 Infantry
10 Apr - 14 Apr	GS 1st Infantry Division, Reinforcing 8/6 Arty

e. C Battery was moved to XUAN LOC base camp on 16 April reverting to battalion control.

f. On 14 March B Battery was attached to the 3/82 Arty and moved into a tactical position north of TAY NINH City to support Operation Junction City, and from 14 March to 10 April B Battery remained in a role of GSR the 3/82 Arty. During this period the battery made 10 tactical moves within QUAN PHUOC Province. On 10 April B Battery was detached from the 25th Infantry Division and moved to GO DAU HA, XT412239, with a role of GS to II Field Force Vietnam, Reinforcing the 25th Infantry Division Artillery.

g. On 21 March A Battery was moved from its base camp at NUI DAT to the southeast to support Operation Portsea, an Australian Task Force search and destroy operation. Battery mission during the operation was Reinforcing the 1st Bn, 83d Arty. Battery was split on 5 April and three guns each put

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SECTION I (Cont'd)

in two separate tactical positions. The unit was consolidated in the original field location on 12 April and returned to NUI DAT base camp 15 April.

h. On 22 April the mission for B Battery was changed to reinforcing the 25th Infantry Division and the battery displaced to a fire support base at XT457268. From this position the battery fired in support of Operation Manhattan, a search and destroy operation in the BOI LOI Woods. At the end of the reporting period the battery was still engaged in this operation.

i. On 25 April C Battery moved to vicinity GIA RAY, YT628113, to support a search and destroy operation of the 3/5 Cavalry, 9th Infantry Division, in that area. At the end of the reporting period the mission was unchanged.

j. The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition expended:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF MISSIONS FIRED</u>	<u>AMMUNITION EXPENDED</u>
A Battery	2,689	16,170
B Battery	2,161	17,567
C Battery	4,139	41,161
TOTAL	8,989	74,898

5. (C) Logistics

a. During the reporting period there has been improvement in all classes of supply with the exception of TA50-901 items. Due to the recent influx of replacements this has become a problem. Close coordination was required to bring rotating personnel in from the field to turn over their equipment to their respective replacements.

b. Maintenance support has improved due to an increase in the stockage of M109 howitzer parts. There continues to be a shortage of replacement parts for multi-fuel vehicles. Primarily, these shortages are fuel tanks, radiators, tires and batteries.

6. (U) Civic Actions

a. During the period 1 February 1967 to 30 April 1967 the Battalion Civic Actions MEDCAP Team concentrated its activities in the assigned sector in LONG KHANH Province, with particular emphasis on the village of TAN LAP, which consists of 5 hamlets. Local GVN, RF/FF and civilian leaders have worked closely with the team to coordinate activities. All projects are of a joint effort with US personnel providing material and technical assistance as required.

SECTION I (Cont'd)

b. The MEDCAP Team, headed by the battalion surgeon, treated 581 patients through visits to TAN LAP. Approximately 24 of those patients have had to be brought in to the province hospital at XUAN LOC or have required follow-up action of some nature. In addition, approximately 78 Vietnamese were treated by battery medics on field operations during this period. The battalion surgeon visited the province hospital on an average of twice weekly during this period, assisting in the wards and in 26 emergency operations.

c. The village of TAN LAP received assistance in the form of soap and food stuffs. Assistance was also given in material and technical aid to improve the sanitation and defense of TAN LAP. This was accomplished through water well improvements, training of the village medic, and work on protective fences and bunkers.

d. The civic action team assisted the XUAN LOC orphanage through the contribution of food stuffs and clothing.

7. (U) Communications

a. From 1 February to 30 April the battalion communications section handled approximately 450 radio messages. The message center handled 750 messages in addition to all incoming and outgoing distribution for the battalion.

b. The battalion communications section has begun an intensified on-the-job training program which encompasses all phases of communications.

c. Supply of communication replacement parts continues to be extremely limited.

SECTION II

PART I, OBSERVATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration.

ITEM: Difficulty in obtaining information about personnel who have been air evacuated.

DISCUSSION: When a unit suffers a casualty requiring emergency air evacuation it loses all contact and is frequently unable to ascertain the seriousness or disposition of the individual. This is particularly true when the individual is moved from aid stations to surgical or evacuation hospitals without being admitted. Although notification is sometimes sent by mail from the hospital admitting the individual, this process takes several days. Since this period is critical for submitting personnel reports it creates a hardship on the unit.

OBSERVATIONS: Present reporting system is too slow to enable units to process required reports and personnel actions within required time.

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SECTION II

PART I, OBSERVATIONS (Cont'd)

2. (U) Intelligence. None
3. (U) Training and Organization. None
4. (C) Operations.

a. ITEM: Hardships created by lack of organic aircraft.

DISCUSSION: This battalion deployed to the Republic of Vietnam less any organic aircraft due to the Department of the Army deletion of the air augmentation as listed in the TOE. This lack of aircraft has proven a severe limitation to target acquisition, command and control, personnel movement, communications, and movement of critical maintenance parts.

OBSERVATION: This battalion should be authorized an augmentation of two O-1 type aircraft and one OH-13 or OH-23 aircraft.

b. ITEM: AM radio transmitter failures.

DISCUSSION: Radio Set, AN/GRC-46 has been used in the continuous wave (CW) mode to a great extent. Experience has shown that the T-195 transmitter does not last under this prolonged use. Downtime rate for this transmitter and repair time have been excessive. Attempts to cool the transmitter by improvised fans and overhead shielding from heat have been unsuccessful.

OBSERVATION: Radio Set, AN/GRC-46 is not sufficiently durable for sustained operation in a tropical climate.

c. ITEM: Problems inherent in apparent change of mortar tactics.

DISCUSSION: Recent use of heavy mortars and daylight attacks by the enemy have created increased demands on bunker construction and passive defense measures. Mortaring of C Battery during noon meal hours indicates an effort to attack when personnel are congregated and unprotected.

OBSERVATION: Personnel losses and injuries through mortar attacks can be reduced by increased emphasis on construction of bunkers with overhead cover; however, batteries are severely limited by the quantity of engineer materials that can be carried organically. The availability and field delivery of sufficient engineer construction materials must be improved. A lesson relearned is that meal hours must be established on a random schedule, positions of serving lines and wash cans frequently changed and troop congregation prevented. All personnel should return to their duty stations to eat so as to have immediate access to personnel shelters. The increased use of expendable eating utensils will prevent exposure of personnel while washing mess gear.

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SECTION II

PART I, OBSERVATIONS (Cont'd)

d. ITEM: Need for mechanized earth moving equipment at unit level.

DISCUSSION: Batteries are being deployed in tactical missions which require frequent moves. Each time a battery moves into a new area it is extremely vulnerable to mortar or ground attack until proper bunkers are constructed. With units moving daily, there often is insufficient time to construct these bunkers properly without some mechanized earth moving machinery. This requirement to prepare positions by hand also leads to serious problems of personnel fatigue, a major contributing factor in artillery incidents. When a unit prepares to leave a position area it takes several hours to fill in bunkers and level parapets.

OBSERVATION: The only satisfactory method of rapidly preparing satisfactory mortar protection is by utilizing earth moving equipment. It is therefore desirable to attach a scoop loader or bulldozer to a battery that is required to make frequent moves in a high mortar incident rate area. This unit has submitted a request for temporary issue of four scoop loaders, one per firing battery and one for battalion headquarters.

e. ITEM: Reducing the vulnerability of vehicles to mortar attack.

DISCUSSION: It has been found that the primary causes for deadlining vehicles following a mortar attack are punctured tires, radiators, and fuel tanks.

OBSERVATION: By sandbagging, digging in, and providing revetments for vehicles the deadline rate following a mortar attack will be considerably reduced.

SECTION II

PART II, RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration.

Recommend that one central information clearing agency be established in each field force area to provide a locator service for evacuated personnel. Information should be disseminated to parent units by electrical means.

2. (U) Intelligence. None

3. (U) Training and Organization. None

4. (C) Operations.

a. Recommend that artillery battalions in a general support role be authorized organic aircraft as required by their mission.

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SECTION II

PART II, RECOMMENDATIONS (Cont'd)

- b. Recommend that the Radio Set AN/GRC-46 be replaced with RTT Set AN/GRC-142.
- c. Recommend that all separate artillery battalions be provided with some type of earth moving machinery.
5. (U) Logistics. None

William H Ritter
WILLIAM H RITTER
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

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AVGA-C (14 May 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 54TH ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96376 24 May 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: AVFB-
FAC, APO 96266

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVC-DH,
APO 96307

Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, ATTN: ACSFOR-DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 2d Bn, 35th Artillery is considered adequate.

2. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 1, Air Evacuees. Letters have been sent to the Divisions that this Group normally supports in the field, requesting that their liaison personnel at hospitals notify their Division Artillery Headquarters when personnel from 54th Artillery Group Battalions are admitted to the hospital to which they are assigned. This service was requested for units of the Group that are placed under Divisional Operational Control.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 4a, Lack of Organic Aircraft. Artillery units in Vietnam are severely restricted by the lack of organic aircraft. Aircraft are desperately required for target acquisition, command and staff visits, personnel replacements and supply of critical maintenance parts.

4. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 4b, AM Radios. Due to the high failure rate and age of the AN/GRC-46 radios, the Army is in the process of replacing the AN/GRC-46 with the new single side band AM radio AN/GRC-112. This new radio has proven to be more dependable in adverse climates.

5. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 4c, Mortar Attack. Basic artillery training demands the need for proper bunkers and overhead cover for passive defense against mortar attacks. The random feeding times and staggering of mess lines are standard operating procedures.

6. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 4d, Need for Mechanical Earth Moving Equipment. The requirement of firing batteries for mechanical earth moving equipment has been realized. This headquarters is preparing a request for earth moving equipment for all firing units.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65

7. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 4e, Reducing the Vulnerability of Vehicles to Mortar Attack. Sandbagging and protecting vehicles from enemy attack are SOP.

8. (U) Reference Section II, Part II. This Headquarters concurs in all recommendations of the 2d Bn, 35th Artillery

Charles M. Mizell
CHARLES M. MIZELL
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10*

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15
AVFB-FAC (14 May 67) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U)

Department of the Army, Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery,
APO 96266

9 JUN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH,
APO 96307
Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOR-OT,
APO 96558


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

2. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph 4b, AM Radios. The deadline rate for the radio set AN/GRC-46 has been high throughout the command. Suitable cooling equipment should be provided for the Electronic Equipment Shelter S-890/G and the issue of the new radio sets AN/GRC-142 and 122 should be expedited. This recommendation was included in all previous reports of this headquarters.

3. (C) Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph 4d, Need for Mechanical Earth Moving Equipment. This headquarters is presently staffing the letter referenced in paragraph 6, 1st Indorsement.

4. (U) Concur with other comments, recommendations, and observations in basic document and 1st Indorsement.


RAYMOND P. MURPHY
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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AVFBC-H (9 May 67)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th
Artillery, 30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 16 JUN 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307


Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The inclosed report is forwarded.
2. (U) Concur with all comments and recommendations in the report
and two indorsements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
no


JAMES A. ULVENES
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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17
AVHGC-DST (9 May 1967) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 8 JUL 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GJCI-OT,
AFO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning shortage of replacement parts for multi-fuel vehicles, paragraph 5b, page 7: Concur. There have been shortages of batteries and tires in the past, however, decline reports at this headquarters do not reflect any shortages of these or other parts for this vehicle.

b. Reference item concerning hardships created by lack of organic aircraft, page 9, and paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement: The requirement for aviation support is recognized; however, this headquarters has no assets with which to fill this requirement. Assets to meet this and similar requirements have been requested from DA by this headquarters. Until such time that requested assets are made available, aviation support must be provided from resources currently available to II Field Force Vietnam.

c. Reference item concerning the difficulty in obtaining information about personnel who have been air evacuated, page 8, paragraph 2 and paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement, and page 10: Under the provisions of USARV Regulation 40-8, a copy of the hospital admission and disposition report is required to be sent to the parent organization of each patient admitted or dispositioned. It is acknowledged that distribution and communication delay do create difficulties as noted. The solution of such problems lies with improved direct liaison between the medical unit or surgeons providing organic medical service and the supporting hospitals. It is only through this method that essential information can be obtained in a timely manner.

d. Reference item concerning AM radio transmitter failures, page 9, paragraph 4, 1st Indorsement, and page 10: Concur with the comments of the 1st Indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


E. J. KENNEDY

Cpt. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 18 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

18
GPOP-DT (9 May 67)

5th Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967
from HQ, 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 13 OCT 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG